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Understanding STIP in Developing Countries: Another Dance? 
 
Abstract: This paper is work-in-progress in the framework of the introductory chapter of the 
edited book “International Research Handbook on Science, Technology and Innovation 
Policy in Developing Countries: Rationales and Relevance;” Kuhlmann, S. and Ordóñez-
Matamoros, H.G. (Eds), to be published (hopefully) this year by Edward Elgar. It proposes a 
systemic view of innovation policy in developing countries as resulting from dynamic 
interactions (or the lack thereof) between innovation theory, policy and practice which, 
seen as three diverse and changing “poles,” influence and/or respond (or not) to each other, 
leading to a variety of innovation, policy-practice-theory configurations. In so doing, the 
Innovation Policy Dance Metaphor proposed by Kuhlmann, Shapira and Smits (2010) is used, 
adapted and expanded, as a device to analyse the cases of Brazil, Colombia, India and South 
Africa. According to this approach, “ideas, rationales and instruments of innovation policy 
emerge as a result of interactive learning among actors involved in innovation practice (I), 
innovation-related public intervention strategies (P), and innovation research and theory 
(T), where mutually learning (by interacting), they constantly create and change IPT 
configurations, and where sometimes innovation practice is the driving force in a 
configuration, sometimes theory, sometimes public or private policy. The dancers may 
happen to bump into each other or may enjoy phases of pure harmony.”  
 
Preliminary conclusions regarding the rationales and relevance of science, technology and 
innovation policy in developing countries are proposed based on text analyses studying 
innovation policy in the selected set of countries. The aforementioned metaphor is used to 
interpret ITP trajectories in these countries and by so doing to identify voids or systemic 
failures. The instrumental value of the metaphor is also assessed.  
 
‘Dancers’ and their ‘moves’ include: a) entrepreneurs, who tend to think in terms of market 
success and strategic advantages or, in the case of NGOs, they have their issues to pursue 
(e.g. health improvement, clean environment, etc.); b) government agencies, who have 
overall goals like security, quality of life, sustainability, etc., under which a variety of actions 
are implemented; and c) researchers, who strive for understanding the world around them, 
and for creating original or applicable ideas. These dancers, are not homogeneous “poles”, 
however, as “conflicts” or tensions exist and change overtime (for example between 
innovations theories, between roles assigned to governments, and between strategies for 
learning, adopting and innovation practices).  
 
Types of ‘learning-by dancing’ include a) first-order learning: reacting to observed changes 
in a conservative manner, and b) second-order learning: adopting or developing new 
assumptions, targets and measures. Forms of learning are: a) formal learning (FL) in 
“classrooms,” particularly fruitful for entrepreneurs and policymakers; b) learning by using 
(LU) in applying policy measures (key for entrepreneurs) and using performance and impact 




evaluations (key for policymakers); c) learning by interacting (LI) in working with 
consultants, exchanging ideas, attending workshops, etc. (valuable for all dancers); learning 
by searching (LS) in desks, labs, interviews, evaluations, etc. (typical among researchers); 
and learning by anticipating (LA) in strategic intelligence forums and observation activities 
(presumably/potentially present among all).  
 
Preliminary findings about the role of theory from the cross country analyses include: a) 
explicit innovation policies (discourse + action) emerged by mid-90s, led by 
western/northern (OECD-type of) reasoning (capitalist systems of innovation). However, in 
some countries such “policies” continue to be more fancy discourse-framing devices than 
facts; b) loans from international financial organizations (e.g. IDB, WB, etc.), play important 
roles into transferring ideas to actions (for good and for bad…); c) during the 2000s, 
innovation policy rationales continued to be mostly “imported” and discursive, but new 
indigenous ideas (and to a lesser extent programmes) surfaced (e.g. social innovation, 
innovation for inclusion, etc.); d) overall, innovation practice lags behind, mostly due to 
‘rentism’/shortermism,’ lack of learning opportunities and support; and d) those sectors 
‘connected’ to the rest of the world, improved fast, leading to increased inequality.  
 
Preliminary findings about the role of policy include: a) innovation “policies” are more 
“documents” and intentions/desires than actions/programmes/projects ($€?); b) they are 
mostly ‘elitists’; and c) they are more focused on innovation than on learning. Lack of policy 
impact evaluations makes difficult to judge their actual role, however.  
 
Regarding the metaphor as analytical device, it a) proved useful for better understanding 
theory, practice and governance issues around STI; b) helps in looking at (rival) explanations, 
and in making ‘visible’ logical connections that can be overlooked, mostly due to lack of 
information or dedicated reflection. In fact, although “logical connections” do not explain 
“reality”, they do help in creating plausible stories and narratives, which not only nurtures 
relevant debates, but that can also become latter hypotheses and objects of study in future 
STI policy research; c) helps finding theoretical lacunae, systemic failures, policy voids, and 
room for further exploration, experimentation or advocacy; and d) allows the analysis of 
national systems as “dynamic objects” from a historical and contextual perspective, 
something that the traditional National of Innovation System approach fails completely.  
 
However, the metaphor exhibits some weaknesses as well. These are: a) it can mislead 
understanding if it is not applied correctly. In fact, it may lead to overemphasizing the role 
of theory, as the device can be used as an ex-post facto framing tool, therefore overlooking 
the “real” role of both political opportunistic/innovative governments, or entrepreneurs. For 
example, in the case of Colombia, it is possible that the new STIP configuration (resulting 
from the SGR scheme since 2011) has no relation with a specific theory/model/concept/idea 
inspiring it (this is in fact an open question today), but that it resulted from debates on 
corruption involving the royalty producing regions, or after claims made by left-wing 
movements and armed groups, or more plausible, a combination of all these factors; b) by 
emphasizing on the learning outcome, it does not allow capturing truly disconnected 
‘events’: cases where the partners do not seem to ‘learn’ (e.g the Sisyphus tragedy referred 
elsewhere), which seem common in some developing countries. For example, in the case of 
Colombia, as Salazar claims, Colciencias’ capabilities and experience in managing R&D built 




the least 50 years is today completely ignored, where in the regions the people seem to be 
sort of “re-inventing the wheel.” Policymakers do not seem to have learned from theory and 
practice; and c) as Kuhlmann et al acknowledge, “although at first sight industry, academia 
and the politico-administrative system appear clearly different in terms of membership, 
constituency, relevance criteria and reward mechanisms, taking a closer view one would 
face a more blurred picture.” For example, the role of key people affiliated with the OECD 
who belong to both types of dancers of government and theory. Or the role of government 
research organizations, which may be both policy and practice dancers.  
 
This paper is relevant for the current Manchester EU-SPRI Conference as it points to 
contribute to better understand a) policy dynamics and policy impacts in developing 
countries; b) the rise of goal, challenge or mission orientation in science and technology 
policies in these countries; and c) questions and claims of responsible governance in science 
and technology policies increasingly debated in these countries.  
 
In particular, it explicitly addresses topics such as a) policy emergence, implementation, 
diffusion and transfer; b) national science policies and the global scientific enterprise; and c) 
one size does not fit all? STI policies for less-developed and emerging economies.  
